Commentary by Avi-Yonah, Reuven S.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
2007 
Commentary 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah 
University of Michigan Law School, aviyonah@umich.edu 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters/65 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/book_chapters 
 Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, Taxation-Transnational Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Publication Information & Recommended Citation 
Avi-Yonah, Reuvan S. "Commentary." In The Tillinghast Lecture, 1996-2005, edited by New York Univ. 
School of Law, 117-25. New York: NYU School of Law, 2007. (Commentary on "International Tax Arbitrage 
and the 'International Tax System'" by H.D. Rosenbloom) 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized 
administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Commentary 
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
David Rosenbloom has delivered an important lecture on an impor­
tant topic:1 whether exploiting differences between the tax system of 
two different jurisdictions to minimize the taxes paid to either or both 
("international tax arbitrage") is a problem, and if so, whether any­
thing can be done about it in a world without a "world tax organiza­
tion." As Rosenbloom states, international tax arbitrage is "the 
planning focus of the future,"2 and recently has been the focus of con­
siderable discussion and debate (for example, upon the promulgation 
and subsequent withdrawal under fire of Notice 98-11).3 Rosen­
bloom's lecture is one of the first attempts to address the underlying 
questions in a systematic manner, and thus represents a major contri­
bution to what will no doubt be a fascinating and important debate.4 
In general, Rosenbloom's thesis can be summarized briefly as fol­
lows: International tax arbitrage is the natural response of taxpayers 
to the normal differences that occur between any two tax systems. As 
such, it does not represent a problem, or at least no adequate explana­
tion for why it is a problem has yet been given, other than by invoking 
an "international tax system" that does not exist. Moreover, even if 
international tax arbitrage were a problem, in the current and any rea­
sonably likely future state of the world, no solution is likely to be 
available. Therefore, tax policymakers should not bother to try to 
combat international tax arbitrage, and should repeal those provisions 
(such as the dual consolidated loss rules5) that are inspired by the de­
sire to prevent it. 
While I tend to approach these issues from a different perspective 
than Rosenbloom, I completely agree that tax policymakers and schol­
ars have not done a good job in articulating what is wrong with inter­
national tax arbitrage. This Commentary perhaps may serve its 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
1 David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage, 53 Tax L. Rev. 137 (2000). 
2 Id. at 166. 
3 Notice 98-11, 1988-6 I.RB. 13, withdrawn by Notice 98-35, 1998-27 I.RB. 35. 
4 For an earlier contribution, see the excellent discussion of the arbitrage problem in 
Philip R West, Foreign Law in U.S. International Taxation: T he Search for Standards, 3 
Fla. Tax Rev. 147 ( 1996). 
5 IRC § 1503( d). 
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purpose if it begins the task of doing so. I would like to address three 
specific points in Rosenbloom's argument: (1) the existence vel non 
of an "international tax system," or as I prefer to call it the "interna­
tional tax regime," (2) whether international tax arbitrage presents a 
problem from the perspective of broadly accepted policy goals that 
underlie the international tax regime, and (3) given that in my view, 
international tax arbitrage is a problem, what can be done about it in a 
world with many taxing jurisdictions and no world tax organization 
with powers to enforce its views of the proper interpretation of na­
tional tax laws. 
II. Is THERE AN INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME? 
Rosenbloom begins his lecture by quoting from the legislative his­
tory of the dual consolidated loss rules a statement referring to an 
"international tax system. "6 He then proceeds to deny the existence 
of this system or regime ("that system appears to be imaginary"7), 
because in the real world, only the different tax laws of various coun­
tries exist, and those laws vary greatly from each other.8 Of course, 
this description is true as far as it goes, but is this the whole truth? As 
Rosenbloom notes, in fact, there has been a remarkable degree of 
convergence even in the purely domestic tax laws of developed coun­
tries.9 Not only can tax lawyers talk to each other across national 
boundaries and understand what each is saying (the terminology is the 
same), but the need to face similar problems in taxing income has led 
jurisdictions with different starting points to reach quite similar re­
sults. For example, countries that started off with global tax systems 
now have incorporated schedular elements (for example, the capital 
loss and passive activity loss rules in the United States10), whereas 
countries with a schedular background have largely adopted schedules 
for "other income" that lead to a global tax base.11 
Not surprisingly, this convergence is most advanced in international 
tax matters, because in this case the tax laws of various jurisdictions 
actually interact with each other, and one can document cases of di­
rect influence. For example, every developed country now tends to 
tax currently passive income earned by its residents overseas (through 
controlled foreign corporations and foreign investmeent funds (FIF) 
6 Rosenbloom, note 1, at 137 (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-313, at 422 (1986)). 
7 Id. at 166. 
B Id. at 140-41. 
9 Id. at 140. 
IO IRC §§ 1211, 469. 
11 This is the case in Japan, which has a schedule for "miscellaneous" income. See gen­
erally Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 155-57 (Hugh J. Ault ed., 
1997). 
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rules, which were inspired by the U.S. example12), and to exempt or 
defer active business income. Thus, the distinction between countries 
that assert worldwide taxing jurisdiction and those that only tax terri­
torially has lost much of its force. 
The claim that an international tax regime exists, however, rests 
mainly on the bilateral tax treaty network, which, as Rosenbloom 
states, is "a triumph of international law."13 The treaties are of course 
remarkably similar (even to the order of the articles),14 being based 
on the same OECD and UN models.15 In most countries, the treaties 
have a higher status than domestic law, and thus constrain domestic 
tax jurisdiction; and even in the United States, the treaties typically 
override contrary domestic law.16 This means that in international tax 
matters, countries typically are bound by treaty to behave in certain 
ways (for example, not tax a foreign seller who has no permanent es­
tablishment17), and cannot enact legislation to the contrary. 
I would argue that the network of 1,500 or more bilateral tax trea­
ties that are largely similar in policy, and even in language, constitutes 
an international tax regime, which has definable principles that under­
lie it and are common to the treaties. These principles are the single 
tax principle and the benefits principle, which I have articulated else­
where.18 In brief, the single tax principle states that income from 
cross-border transactions should be subject to tax once (that is, not 
more but also not less than once), at the rate determined by the bene­
fits principle. The benefits principle allocates the right to tax active 
business income primarily to the source jurisdiction and the right to 
tax passive investment income primarily to the residence jurisdiction. 
I develop the implications of these principles for international tax ar­
bitrage below. 
To those who doubt the existence of the international tax regime, 
let me pose the following question: Suppose you were advising a de­
veloping country or transition economy that wanted to adopt an in­
come tax for the first time. How free do you think you would be to 
write the international tax rules for such a country in any way you 
wanted, assuming that it wished to attract foreign investment? I 
12 IRC §§ 957, 1297. 
13 Rosenbloom, note 1, at 164. 
14 John F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 Tax L. Rev. 1, 2 ( 1999). 
ls OECD, Model Income Tax Convention on Income and Capital, July 23, 1992, 1 Tax 
Treaties (CCH) <JI 191 [hereinafter OECD Model Treaty); U.N., Model Double Taxation 
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, 1980, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 
<JI 206 [hereinafter UN Model Treaty]. 
16 See, e.g., IRC §§ 894(a), 7852(d). 
17 OECD Model 'freaty, note 16, art 7(1), 1 Tax 'Jfeaties (CCH) '1191. 
18 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Inte�ational Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 Tax L. 
Rev. 507 ( 1999). 
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would argue that the freedom of most countries to adopt international 
tax rules is severely constrained, even before entering into any tax 
treaties, by the need to adapt to generally accepted principles of inter­
national taxation. Even if divergent rules have been adopted, the pro­
cess of integration into the world economy forces change. For 
example, Mexico recently had to abandon its long tradition of apply­
ing formulas in transfer pricing and adopt rules modeled after the 
OECD guidelines19 in order to be able to join the OECD.20 South 
Korea similarly bad to change its broad interpretation of what consti­
tutes a permanent establishment under pressure from the OECD.21 
And Bolivia had to abandon its attempt to adopt a cash flow corpo­
rate tax because it was ruled not creditable in the United States.22 
Even .the United States is not immune to this type of pressure to con­
form, as can be seen if one compares the 1993 proposed regulations 
under § 482,23 which led to an international uproar,24 with the final 
regulations, which reflect the OECD guidelines. 2s 
III. Is INTERNATIONAL TAX ARBITRAGE A PROBLEM? 
Given that the international tax regime exists, in what way can in­
ternational tax arbitrage be regarded as problematic under its princi­
ples? In general, the various examples of international tax arbitrage 
given by Rosenbloom all have a similar goal, to exploit differences in 
national tax rules (and despite convergence, such differences remain 
considerable, although they are shrinking) to minimize taxes paid on 
cross-border income in either or both jurisdictions. The dual consoli­
dated loss transaction involves using the same economic loss to offset 
the income of two related taxpayers in two jurisdictions; since only 
one loss has occurred, by definition, tax is underpaid in one of the two 
jurisdictions. The transactions covered in Notice 98-1126 and in Sec-
19 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Adminis­
trators, reprinted in 9 Tax Notes Int'! 55 (July 28, 1994). 
20 See Jaime Gonzalez-Bendiksen, Mexico Amends Transfer Pricing Rules, 97 TNI 27-
24, Feb. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File. 
21 See J.Y. Lee & R.M. Donaldson, South Korea Moves to Ease Tax Rule Governing 
Foreign Companies, 94 TNI 233-4, Dec. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File. 
22 Peter D. Byrne, The Business Assets Tax in Latin America-The End of the Begin­
ning or the Beginning of the End?, 15 Tax Notes Int'! 941, 944 n.10 (Sept. 22, 1997). 
23 Intercompany 'Il'ansfer Pricing Regulations Under § 482, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,310 (Jan. 21, 
1993). 
24 Robert G. Clark, Transfer Pricing, Section 482, and International Tax Conflict: Get­
ting Harmonized Income Allocation Measures From Multinational Cacophony, 42 Am. 
U.L. Rev. 1155, 1190 (1993). 
25 Reg. § 1.482-6. For 'Il'easury's discussion of the changes made to conform the final 
regulations to OECD guidelines, see Intercompany Transfer Pricing Regulations Under 
§ 482, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,971, 34,975-34,976 (July 8, 1994). 
26 1998-6 I.R.B. 13, withdrawn by Notice 98-35, 1998-27 l.R.B. 35. 
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tion 894(c) are even better from the taxpayer's perspective, because 
they result in no current tax being paid in either of the two jurisdic­
tions involved. 
The,.c;;e transactions violate the first principle of international taxa­
tion mentioned above, the single tax principle, which states that in­
come from cross-border transactions should be subject to tax once, 
that is, not more than once but also not less than once (at the appro­
priate residence or source rate, as determined under the benefits prin­
ciple). The single tax principle is embodied in the typical title of the 
tax treaties "for the prevention of double taxation" (not more than 
once) "and fiscal evasion" (not less than once). It also has been ar­
ticulated by the architects of the international tax regime from T.S. 
Adams through Stanley Surrey and David Tillinghast.27 
Rosenbloom's lecture fundamentally challenges us to explain the 
normative basis of the single tax principle. I would argue that it rests 
on three normative justifications: efficiency, equity, and preventing 
revenue loss. First, efficiency: The typical argument against undertax­
ing income from cross-border transactions is made in the name of cap­
ital export neutrality. If taxpayers invest abroad and by using 
international tax arbitrage earn higher after-tax returns than on do­
mestic investments earning a higher before-tax return, they will prefer 
the former investments over the latter. Thus, resources will be allo­
catep away from their most productive use, resulting in diminished 
global welfare. 
I would not emphasize this argument too much, in part because it 
can be countered with arguments in favor of capital import neutrality 
(involving neutrality in the global allocation of savings rather than in­
vestment). Moreover, arguments from global welfare tend to be less 
than fully persuasive to a noneconomic audience. A different argu­
ment can be made, however, regarding the impact of international tax 
arbitrage on efficiency in the domestic economy. If cross-border in­
vestments are taxed at a lower rate than domestic investments, capital 
will tend to shift from the latter to the former. Such a shift would 
result in an over-supply of capital for cross-border investments and an 
under-supply for domestic investments. The resulting efficiency loss is 
similar to the one Arnold C. Harberger identified in analyzing the ef­
fect of the double tax on corporate income in a closed economy.28 
Note that fairness is not an issue in this case, because it is presumed 
27 Thomas S. Adams, International and Interstate Aspects of Double Taxation, 22 Nat'l 
Tax Ass'n Proc. 193 (1929); The President's Tax Message, H.R. Rep. No. 87-140, at 6-7 
(1961) (views of Surrey and Tillinghast proposing to end deferral on all income of CFCs to 
tax investment-in low-tax jurisdictions). 
28 Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. Pol. Econ. 
215 (1%2). 
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than investors can freely shift capital from domestic to foreign 
investments. 
Fairness does enter the picture, however, in making a different com­
parison, between taxpayers who earn domestic labor income aDd tax­
payers who earn capital income overseas and can benefit from 
international tax arbitrage. In this case, efficiency is not the issue be­
cause the wage earners cannot realistically shift their income overseas 
(especially given immigration restrictions); in general, labor is less mo­
bile than capital. One of the remarkable trends in recent years has 
been the rise in the tax burden on labor in OECD member countries 
(involving not just the income tax but even more so the VAT and pay­
roll taxes) and the concomitant decline in the effective tax rate on 
capital.29 A major reason for this trend has been the ability of capital 
to move overseas where it can avoid taxation through techniques like 
international tax arbitrage (as well as ordinary tax evasion and taking 
advantage of tax competition). Recent studies using Treasury data 
have shown a 15% drop in the effective foreign tax rate of U.S.-based 
multinationals from 1984 to 1992, and that rate is now significantly 
lower than the effective U.S. tax rate (which explains why no U.S.­
based multinationals are in an excess credit position despite the higher 
nominal foreign tax rates).30 International tax arbitrage is a major 
contributor to these numbers. 
Finally, if cross-border income can escape taxation and capital can 
move freely across borders, this poses a significant threat to the reve­
nues of developed countries, which traditionally have relied on taxing 
income from capital to finance government expenditures. This is pre­
sumably why both the EU and the OECD recently have launched ma­
jor efforts to combat harmful tax competition, which include proposals 
(such as expanding CFC regimes) aimed squarely at opportunities for 
tax arbitrage. 31 
None of the above reasons to enforce the single tax rule is limited to 
tax arbitrage; as Rosenbloom points out, the effect of tax arbitrage is 
similar to simply having different tax rates in different countries.32 
Whether such international tax competition should be curbed is a 
broader issue that I leave for another day. International tax arbitrage 
is a natural primary target of attempts to enforce the single tax rule, 
29 See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far 65 fig. 4.4 (1997). 
30 See Rosanne Altshuler, Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, Has U.S. Investment 
Overseas Become More Sensitive to Tax Rates (paper presented at NBER Int'! Tax'n 
Conf., 1997). 
31 OECD, Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, Harmful Tax Competition: As Emerging Global 
Issue (1998); Council of the European Union, A Package to Tuckie Harmful Tax Competi­
tion in the European Union, 1998 0.J. C102. 
32 Rosenbloom, note 1, at 149. 
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because unlike differences in rates, it results from exploiting interac­
tions between the laws of two countries that clearly were not intended 
by either. Thus, it is far easier to reach a consensus on curbing inter­
national tax arbitrage (since both countries will agree that the effect 
was unintended) than it is to agree on curbing tax competition in 
general. 
IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE ABouT INTERNATIONAL TAX ARBITRAGE? 
Given that the international tax regime exists and that international 
tax arbitrage violates one of its fundamental· principles, what can be 
done about it? It is hard to suggest a generally applicable solution 
because the forms of international tax arbitrage are as varied as the 
vagaries of national tax laws and the ingenuity of international tax 
planners. Let me make one suggestion, however: Perhaps more at­
tention should be paid to the principle of matching in international 
taxation. 
Matching is an underlying characteristic of the value added tax. 
Under the VAT, no deduction is allowed (in a subtraction method 
VAT) and no credit is given (in a credit method VAT) unless it can be 
shown that the party on the other side of the transaction has paid its 
VAT liability on the relevant supply of goods or services. Matching is 
natural to the VAT because it is a transactionally-based tax and be­
cause the tax is supposed to be shifted forward and therefore the iden­
tity of the taxpayer matters less than in the income tax. But matching 
(or "substitute taxation") is not unknown in the income tax area, as 
indicated by provisions like § 83(h) and § 404(a)(5). In the U.S. inter­
national tax area, the prime example of matching is the earnings strip­
ping rule, although it only applies in the related party context. 33 
Income tax treaties generally are based on the matching principle. 
That is, withholding taxes are reduced because the income is subject 
to tax on a residence basis, and the exchange of information provi­
sions ensure that it is in fact taxed. Tax havens are not proper treaty 
partners precisely because matching would be violated by reducing 
withholding taxes for income earned by their residents, since there is 
no residence-based taxation. That is why§ 894(c) is a proper interpre­
tation of the Canada-U.S. treaty34: The reduction in withholding tax 
on interest assumed that it would be taxed by Canada and not treated 
33 IRC § 163(j); see Deborah Geier, The Myth of the Matching Principle as a Tax Value, 
15 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 17 (1998); Julie Roin, Unmasking the Matching Principle in Tax Law, 
79 Va. L. Rev. 813 (1993). 
34 Income Tax Convention, Aug. 16, 1984, Can.-U.S., 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 'l[ 1901. 
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as tax-free dividends. That is also why treaty shopping is properly 
curbed by limitations on benefits articles. 35 
I would argue that the matching principle should be extended be­
yond the treaty context. 1bis would imply that no reductions in with­
holding taxes should be made outside the treaty context; for example, 
the portfolio interest exemption36 should be repealed. Moreover, 
deferral should be conditioned explicitly on the deferred income being 
subject to a reasonable level of tax overseas (that is, there should be a 
low tax kick-in as well as a high tax kick-out). This latter rule would 
take care of the transactions targeted in Notice 98-11. More generally, 
consideration should be given to denying deductions for interest or 
royalties paid to nonresidents unless it can be documented that they 
are subject to tax abroad.37 
The application of the matching principle to international income 
taxation would go a long way toward reducing the opportunities for 
international tax arbitrage and enforcing the single tax principle. Pre­
sumably, the international tax bar can think up tax arbitrage tech­
niques that do not depend on the absence of matching, but this is true 
of every move to enhance tax collections, and is not a sufficient reason 
to refrain from even trying. Moreover, to the extent that other U.S. 
rules such as check-the-box38 enhance arbitrage possibilities (because, 
as Rosenbloom says, they depart from the international norm39), they 
represent bad tax policy and should be reconsidered. 
One important feature of matching is that it does not require a 
world tax organization or international coordination. Each country, 
like the United States, can apply the matching principle unilaterally. 
Arguably, as shown by the enactment of § 894(c), and before it, the 
qualified resident rule in § 884,40 it does not violate treaties to apply 
the matching principle in the treaty context because treaties are based 
on matching. 
It may be argued, however, that a country that applies the matching 
principle unilaterally will hurt itself because it will drive away inves­
tors who rely on not being taxed anywhere. That was presumably why 
the portfolio interest exemption was enacted. The recent coordinated 
actions by the EU (which proposed a uniform withholding rate on 
35 U.S. Model Income Tux Convention, Sept. 20, 1996, art. 22, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 
'l[ 214. 
36 IRC §§ 871(c), 1441(c)(9). 
37 Determining the effective foreign tax rate may not be easy, but it is not impossible 
either. Many OECD member countries explicitly condition their deferral regimes on for­
eign tax rates. See Stephen E. Shay, Revisiting U.S. Anti-Deferral Rules, 74 Taxes 1042 
(1996). 
38 Reg. § 301.7701-3. 
39 Rosenbloom, note 1, at 153. 
40 IRC § 884(e). 
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interest from member countries) and the OECD (which favors ex­
panding CFC and FIF rules41), however, promise that developed 
countries can act in tandem to curtail any harm from imposing limita­
tions on international tax arbitrage. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Rosenbloom argues that "there does not appear to be any clear rea­
son why U.S. tax policy should take account of the fact that the tax­
payer or a related party enjoys benefits under the tax laws of another 
country with respect to income or activities not subject to U.S. taxa­
tion. The treatment of that income or those activities is not obviously 
our business, and there is no clear reason why we should make it our 
business--any more than the rules of that other country applicable to 
its own citizens and residents on its own soil with respect to anticom­
petitive behavior, corrupt practices, or the price of water."42 
Those examples are illuminating, because, in fact, the United States 
made all three of them its business, as indicated by recent develop­
ments in the international application of antitrust laws, the foreign 
corrupt practices act and its OECD corollary, and international envi­
ronmental laws.43 Moreover, as the recent crisis in Asia and its ramifi­
cations show, developments in one area can spread rapidly to other 
areas, and this sometime makes what happens in other countries our 
business. The rise of international tax arbitrage is merely one exam­
ple of a much broader phenomenon: The purposes of an increasing 
number of national laws can be completely defeated if they are not 
applied extraterritorially or coordinated with the laws of other coun­
tries. We live in an integrating world, and perhaps in the long run, 
worldwide institutions like the WTO are the only . possible solutions. 
But in the meantime, it is not an adequate answer to the problem of 
international tax arbitrage to say that it is just a normal feature of the 
world we live in and nothing can be done about it. If the "triumph" 
that is the international tax regime is to be preserved, something must. 
41 See note 12. 
42 Rosenbloom, note 1, at 155. 
43 On the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law, see, e.g., Philip Areeda & 
Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases 153-66 (4th ed. 1988); on the For­
eign Corrupt Practices Act, see Pub. L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977); on international appli­
cation of U.S. environmental law see, e.g., Peter Obstler, Toward a Working Solution to 
Global Pollution: Importing CERCLA to Regulate the Export of Hazardous Waste, 16 
Yale J. Int'! L. 73 (1991). 
